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The efficiency of common law rules is central to achieving efficient resource allocation in a market
economy. While many theories suggest reasons why judge-made law should tend toward efficient
rules, the question whether the common law actually does converge in commercial areas has remained
empirically untested. We create a dataset of 465 state-court appellate decisions involving the application
of the Economic Loss Rule in construction disputes and track the evolution of law in this area from
1970 to 2005. We find that over this period the law did not converge to any stable resting point and
evolved differently in different states. We find that legal evolution is influenced by plaintiffs' claims,














  We investigate the evolution of a particular common law rule pertaining to the 
construction industry, as developed by state appellate courts in the United States over the 
last 35 or so years. Although the topic might at first glance appear esoteric, the evolution 
and efficiency of legal rules are central to understanding any market economy. The 
simplest way to see this is by going back to the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960). The 
Theorem holds that, as long as initial property rights are well defined and private parties 
whose behavior affects each other can freely negotiate and contract over their conduct, 
they will agree to act efficiently. Such efficient behavior maximizes total surplus, which 
parties can agree to divide via contract among themselves.  
But what if the parties cannot negotiate and contract (perhaps because of high 
transaction costs), or have failed to do so? In those cases, efficient resource allocation 
requires that underlying legal rules, such as the rules of liability, provide parties with 
incentives to act efficiently. Such rules would steer parties to outcomes that mimic those 
that the market would produce if transaction costs were low. In a common law system, 
which prevails in most English-speaking nations, including the United States, legal rules 
in a number of important fields, including torts, are created mainly by appellate judges as 
a byproduct of deciding cases. Such rules are modified, and sometimes even reversed, in 
subsequent decisions, so they evolve over time. If the rules are predictable and efficient, 
but not otherwise, parties will act in an efficient manner even without contracting. For 
this reason, the efficiency of common law rules is necessary for attaining efficient 
resource allocation in a market economy.  
  2Scholars in law and economics have sought to understand why common law rules 
might be efficient. Posner (1973) recognized the importance of this question, and argued 
that appellate judges have personal incentives to maximize efficiency. Rubin (1977) and 
Priest (1977) showed that because inefficient legal rules lead to inefficient economic 
outcomes, they are more likely to be challenged in court. Such litigation is likely to drive 
them out in favor of efficient rules, even when judges do not pursue efficiency.
1  
These arguments for efficiency do not come to grips with the legal realist and 
critical legal studies criticism that judges have policy preferences other than social 
welfare or disagree about what serves social welfare. Indeed, a considerable empirical 
literature concludes that judges pursue political objectives (see, e.g., George and Epstein 
(1992), Brenner and Spaeth (1995), Songer and Lindquist (1996), Hansford and Spriggs 
(2006), and Landes and Posner (2007)). When judges follow personal policy preferences, 
the case for the efficiency of common law is harder to make. Nevertheless, one can still 
argue, in the spirit of Cardozo (1921), that the law evolves toward better rules through 
sequential decisions of judges with diverse preferences (see also: Holmes (1897), Frank 
(1930), Llewellyn (1951), Stone (1985), and Posner (2005)).
2  
Yet much of the discussion of the efficiency of legal rules remains theoretical, 
with no empirical studies of how the law evolves in commercial fields that matter for the 
efficiency of resource allocation. That is the gap we try to fill. The doctrine we have 
chosen for our study is an important common law tort doctrine known as the “economic 
                                                 
1 See also: Cooter, Kornhauser, and Lane (1979).  
2 Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) show, for example, that because appellate courts tend to distinguish prior 
cases from current ones on the basis of information generated by the latter, rather than overruling the prior 
cases and thus losing the knowledge generated by them, sequential decision making leads to the refinement 
of the law over time, and thereby improves its efficiency on average even when full efficiency is not 
attained. 
  3loss rule” (ELR). We study the application of the ELR to construction disputes. We ask 
whether the courts have adhered to the ELR (with some standard exceptions that might be 
necessary to make the rule efficient) in the construction industry, and, if not, how the 
pattern of adherence and non-adherence has evolved.  
Stated at its broadest, the ELR holds that one cannot sue in tort for “economic 
loss” unless that loss is accompanied by personal injury or property damage. (“Economic 
loss” thus just means a loss that is not a personal injury or property damage.) So if the 
builder of your house installs windows negligently with the result that they do not keep 
out the rain, you cannot sue the builder in tort for the cost of re-installing the windows 
carefully, because your loss is purely economic.
3 In contrast, if the water that seeps into 
the house because of the badly installed windows damages your furniture (i.e., causes 
damage to other property), then you can sue the builder in tort.  
  The antecedents of ELR are very old, but the doctrine was first clearly articulated 
in the 1960s and applied to disputes in the construction industry in the 1970s.
4 Most 
construction activity is governed by contract, so the vast majority of construction disputes 
are contract disputes. There are two principal types of case in which tort claims and 
therefore the ELR become relevant in construction. In the first, a plaintiff property owner 
sues in tort for economic loss when contracts or warranties have expired or are 
unavailable, or when he simply wants to make additional claims. In the second scenario, 
a builder sues other builders, architects, engineers, inspectors, or manufacturers for 
damages resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligence. We investigate how state 
                                                 
3 But you may be able to recover the cost of repairing or replacing the windows in a suit for breach of 
warranty. 
4 See Barrett (1989) for a discussion of early ELR cases in the construction industry. An important early 
statement of the rule was Holmes’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. 
Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308–310 (1927), an admiralty case. 
  4appellate courts, whose decisions constitute the precedents that shape common law, have 
dealt with such cases.  
We have decided to examine the application of the ELR in the construction 
industry for four reasons. First, construction disputes arise out of commercial relations, 
and legal evolution in commercial law is our principal interest. Second, the industry is 
mature. Any changes we observe in the ELR between its first clear articulation and the 
present day cannot be attributed to changes in the underlying economic activity, but only 
to changes internal to the legal system
5. Third, there do not appear to be differences 
across states in construction that might dictate different legal regimes. (This is important 
because the common law of torts is for the most part a state prerogative. One state is not 
required to decide construction cases the same way as any other state is—for that matter, 
no state is required to make ELR a part of its law.) Thus both time-series and cross-
sectional analysis of ELR should be unaffected by variance in construction methods and 
practices. Fourth, the doctrine is sufficiently recent to enable us to trace its evolution 
under modern conditions, but old enough, and construction disputes common enough, to 
have generated enough appellate cases
6 to allow an empirical analysis of its evolution. 
Our sample contains 465 appellate decisions over 35 years: enough to reach some 
tentative conclusions on how the law evolves but not so many as to make the project 
unmanageable.  
  To understand how the application of the ELR has evolved in construction 
disputes, we examine three principal issues. First, we consider both the bright-line ELR 
                                                 
5 In section V, we discuss some evidence that differences in state growth rates or state construction activity 
cannot account for the differences in the application of the ELR that we document.  
6 Cases at the trial level are rarely decided in judicial opinions that explain the factual and legal issues fully. 
And the opinions of trial judges have only very limited impact on the evolution of legal doctrine, because 
trial-court opinions are not considered precedents, i.e., authorities, binding courts in subsequent decisions. 
  5and the ELR with generally recognized exceptions as candidates for the efficient rule, and 
ask whether the law achieves or moves toward either of them. Second, we ask more 
generally whether the law converges over time to any resting point. If it does not, in an 
environment that is basically stationary, it becomes harder to argue that the law tends 
toward efficiency – whatever one’s view of efficiency is. The absence of a resting point is 
not conclusive evidence of inefficiency. Although the environment may be stable, 
disputes may still involve different facts, creating a process of continuous judicial 
learning that generates a continuous adjustment of the rules. If the law is efficient and the 
facts do not change, however, some tendency toward stability can be expected as a legal 
doctrine matures. Third, we look at the evolution of the law in different jurisdictions. 
Under the assumption that legal rules in the field of construction should not efficiently 
vary across jurisdictions, large differences in the patterns of legal evolution across 
jurisdictions would argue against an inference of efficient judicial rulemaking.  
  To summarize the results, over our sample period the law did not converge to the 
bright-line ELR, to the bright-line ELR with generally recognized exceptions (such as 
fraud), or to any other resting point. While there is some tendency to convergence in the 
first 25 years of the sample, in the last decade courts increasingly have limited the ELR in 
construction by creating idiosyncratic exceptions to it – exceptions adopted in only a few 
jurisdictions and rejected in others. Moreover, while adherence to the ELR in some form 
grows in some states over time, in others it diminishes. These results are inconsistent with 
simple theories of efficient judicial lawmaking.  
  It might seem that judicial disagreement about the proper scope of the ELR makes 
the doctrine unrepresentative as an object of study of legal efficiency by marking it as 
  6controversial. In cases governed by less controversial doctrines, courts would find it 
easier to agree on what would be efficient outcomes, and so there would be faster and 
more complete convergence. But no one doubts that efficiency has some domain in law; 
the interesting question is whether courts can converge to stable rules in the numerous 
areas of law where there is room for disagreement about efficiency or equity. The ELR is 
one such area. 
  In the next section we spell out in more detail the ELR, its application to 
construction, and the exceptions to the rule. Section III describes the data. In Section IV, 
we present basic trends in state appellate courts regarding recovery for economic losses 
in tort, as well as trends in the exceptions to these recoveries. We also discuss the 
predictability of the law. Section V looks behind the trends to ask whether they reflect 
changes in plaintiffs’ claims, the presence of explicit contracts, the economic power of 
the parties, or leadership by the U.S. Supreme Court. We also check how much variation 
there is across states. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. The Economic Loss Rule in Construction Disputes.  
Although the term “Economic Loss Rule” is recent, the idea of barring recovery 
in tort for a pure economic loss is not.
7 The immediate antecedent of the application of 
the ELR in construction cases was its application in products liability cases. In the 1960s, 
                                                 
7 An early U.S. case is Anthony v Slaid., 52 Mass. 290 (1846). The most famous case announcing the 
fundamental principle is Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931), in which Cardozo held that an 
accountant owes no duty to third parties, such as lenders, to refrain from negligently causing economic 
injury (from reliance on accountant’s reports). See also the Robins case, note 3 above, decided four years 
before Ultramares. Feldthusen (2000) provides a detailed historical analysis of tort recovery for economic 
losses in various common law countries. The arguments for limiting recovery in tort for economic loss are 
analyzed in Bishop (1982), Rabin (1985), Goldberg (1994), and Posner (2006). The economic loss rule 
exists in approximately its American form in England, but has much less purchase in Continental European 
law. See Bussani and Palmer (2003). 
  7when the California Supreme Court was making groundbreaking decisions on the liability 
of manufacturers for defective products, the question of liability in cases in which the 
loss was purely economic, with no accompanying personal injury or property damage 
(other than to the defective product itself), was bound to arise, and did. In Seely v White 
Motor Co.,
8 the court ruled on this issue. The plaintiff had purchased a truck with 
defective brakes. The truck overturned, but the plaintiff was not hurt (nor did the accident 
damage any other property). He sued in contract as well as in tort to recover repair costs 
and lost profits. The court held that strict liability was not available and the plaintiff was 
limited to warranty remedies.
9 In later rulings, the ELR was extended to negligence (as 
distinct from strict liability) claims in product cases. 
The theoretical case for the efficiency of the ELR in situations similar to Seely, 
including construction disputes,
10 rests on the possibility of anticipating problems 
through contracts. Applied in situations of low transaction costs, the ELR encourages 
parties to solve their potential problems through contracts. As Posner (1973) pointed out, 
courts prefer parties to govern their relationships through privately negotiated contracts 
rather than through tort suits whenever transaction costs are low enough, because the 
parties know their business better than the judges can. He reiterated this logic as a judge 
in upholding a bright-line ELR in Miller v United States Steel Corp.: “tort law is a 
superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We have a body of 
                                                 
8 63 Cal. 2d 9 (1965). 
9 Seely actually recovered for both the repairs of the truck and lost profits under his warranty, but the case 
is famous because the court established the legal rule with respect to recovery for economic loss in tort. We 
discuss the role of contracts in the application of the ELR in Section V.  
10 In cases such as Ultramares, a crucial efficiency justification for the ELR is that it protects parties 
engaged in normal business conduct from unpredictable tort claims from strangers if an accident occurs. In 
construction disputes, the plaintiffs and the defendants are not strangers, so this argument does not apply.  
  8law designed for such disputes. It is called contract law.” 
11 Thus the buyer of a house 
who worries that it is poorly built should demand a warranty rather than repress his 
concern and seek a remedy in tort should his fears materialize.   
This logic behind the ELR implies denial of monetary recovery to some persons 
harmed by wrongful acts, and this troubles some courts. An example is the 1965 New 
Jersey case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
12 in which a consumer recovered tort 
damages from a carpet manufacturer when he discovered that the carpet had a defect. The 
dealer from whom he had bought the carpet had gone out of business before the 
consumer realized that the defect could not be fixed, so the dealer’s warranty was of no 
value to him; and there was no manufacturer’s warranty. We do not know whether the 
New Jersey court was moved by an alternative view of efficiency or by sympathy for the 
plaintiff, but it rejected the ELR.  
Even those convinced by the basic efficiency logic of the ELR recognize the need 
for some exceptions. One generally recognized exception is fraud (the deliberate 
infliction of an economic loss). Another is economic loss that accompanies a personal 
injury or physical damage, as in a case in which a defectively installed window lets in 
rain that damages furniture. These situations are difficult to anticipate and make 
provision for by contract. In our empirical analysis, we keep track of such generally 
recognized exceptions, bearing in mind that they may be efficient. The bright-line ELR is 
one candidate for an efficient legal rule; the ELR with generally recognized exceptions is 
another. And of course, some courts might not be persuaded by the economic logic of the 
ELR, or might find the outcomes it yields repugnant, and in the latter case might create 
                                                 
11 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). 
12 44 N.J. 52 (1965). 
  9“idiosyncratic” exceptions. Idiosyncratic exceptions are applied inconsistently across 
jurisdictions and sometimes overruled within the same jurisdiction.  
The application of the ELR to construction offers an interesting setting for 
analyzing the behavior of appellate courts. We have a rule that is well-known and can be 
justified using good efficiency arguments, but may leave some courts dissatisfied. We 
have an environment unlikely to be changing over time and from state to state. We can 
ask: what do courts do with this rule over time and space?  Do their decisions converge 
to, or at least move toward, an efficient resting point, which might be the bright-line ELR 
or the ELR with generally recognized exceptions? Do their decisions converge over time 
at all?  Is the evolution of decisions in this area similar across states? Answers to these 
questions would bear on the central questions regarding the efficiency of common law. In 
the next few sections, we attempt to obtain these answers. 
 
III. Data. 
Overview of the Database 
We gathered data on 465 state-court appellate decisions in tort cases involving the 
ELR (see Appendix for details). We have read all these cases and extracted our variables 
from the judicial decisions. We coded the state in which the decision was rendered, the 
date of the decision, and the level of the court (whether the state’s highest court or a 
lower appellate court). We did not include information about individual judges. We 
recorded the type of plaintiff and defendant. We divide parties into one of five general 
categories: (1) property owner; (2) builder (such as general contractors and 
subcontractors); (3) architect, engineer, or inspector; (4) manufacturer; and (5) other (real 
  10estate agent, insurance company, or bank). We noted whether the plaintiff and the 
defendant were parties to a contract and whether any contractual claims were made by the 
plaintiff (breach of contract, breach of express warranty, or breach of implied warranty), 
as well as the outcomes of such claims on trial and on appeal. Our primary interest, 
however, is in the resolution of tort claims.  
Our data collection was motivated in part by the ambiguity of what should be 
considered “efficient” in this context. One possible view is that efficiency calls for 
applying the ELR with no exceptions at all (call this the strict view). Another is that 
efficiency requires applying the ELR with the exceptions that are generally recognized by 
most courts (call this the middle view). A third view holds that courts have vastly more 
information about cases than the researchers do, and so the application of the ELR and its 
exceptions is highly nuanced and contingent on specific facts of the case (call this the 
broad view). Our data allow us to test both the strict and the middle view, but the broad 
view is untestable by the methods that we use.  
We use data about the specifics of tort claims, and whether they are allowed, to 
create tortwin, which denotes the plaintiff’s winning at the appellate level. It is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of “0” if the plaintiff’s claim in tort is barred by the ELR and 
“1” if it is not. We use tortwin to test the strict view of the ELR, under which tortwin 
should be “0” on average. A value of “1” for tortwin does not necessarily mean that the 
plaintiff actually recovered damages. The appellate court may decide that recovery is not 
barred by the ELR but remand the case to a lower court for considering other defenses, 
assessing damages, or resolving other issues material to a final resolution of the dispute.  
 
  11Coding the Reasons for Not Applying the ELR 
We also document the reasons courts give when they do not apply the ELR. There 
are relatively few such reasons, summarized in Table 3.1. In coding the data, we recorded 
the primary exception to the ELR applied by the court. Other exceptions that the court 
mentioned along the way (dicta rather than the holding of the case) we ignore. 
Generally recognized 
exceptions 
•  Other property  
•  Independent torts 
•  Generally recognized independent duties 
o  Statutory independent duties 
o  Architect’s independent duty to a general contractor 
under the Restatement on Torts 
Idiosyncratic 
exceptions 
•  Idiosyncratic independent duties 
o  Builders owing an independent duty to property owners 
o  Builders owing an independent duty to other builders 
o  Architects owing an independent duty to property 
owners 
o  Architects owing an independent duty to subcontractors 
o  Manufacturers owing a independent duty to property 
owners 
•  Other reasons 
o  The plaintiff does not have a contractual remedy 
o  The economic loss rule applies only to commercial 
plaintiffs 
o  The economic loss rule does not apply to negligence 
claims 
o  Sudden and calamitous event poses unreasonable risk 
of injury 
Table 3.1: Distinction between generally recognized exceptions and exceptions that are idiosyncratic. 
 
 
We distinguish between two categories of reasons given by a court for its 
decision: (1) generally recognized exceptions to ELR; and (2) idiosyncratic exceptions. 
Under the middle view of efficiency, tortwin should be “0” other than when courts apply 
generally recognized exceptions. There are three kinds of generally recognized 
exceptions: 
Independent Torts: Pure economic loss can occur as a result of either intentional 
or unintentional wrongdoing. Intentional wrongdoing is a standard exception to the ELR. 
  12For example, when the defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to sign a contract, the 
ELR does not bar him from suing the defendant in tort for fraud.  
Other Property: Plaintiffs are permitted to recover tort damages for personal 
injury or property damage. In products liability cases, this includes damage caused by a 
defective product to other property belonging to the plaintiff, as well as to property 
belonging to a third party. Damage to the defective product itself is treated as economic 
loss, but if other property of the plaintiff is damaged, the ELR does not preclude 
recovery. State courts vary in their application of this exception. For simplicity, we 
classify all applications of the other property exception as generally recognized. 
Generally recognized Independent Duty: Courts have recognized exceptions in 
which defendants owe a duty to the plaintiff that is independent of any contract. Many of 
these exceptions are idiosyncratic, but two are generally recognized. First, as noted in 
section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, architects have an independent duty to 
a general contractor. This seems an efficient way of avoiding making architects contract 
separately with builders when both have already contracted with the owner. Second, 
several states have enacted statutory duties in this area. For example, Florida has imposed 
a number of statutory duties upon builders, architects, and inspectors. Section 553.84 of 
Florida Statutes (1995) provides a cause of action for economic loss when a builder has 
injured a property owner as a result of violating the building code or doing construction 
without required permits. This duty operates independently of any other available ground 
for a remedy.  
The coding of exceptions as “generally recognized” does not necessarily mean 
that all cases from all jurisdictions have accepted the exception. For example, we have 
  13coded fraudulent inducement as a “generally recognized exception” even though in two 
cases in our dataset fraudulent inducement was held not to constitute an exception. One 
was overruled a year later; the other was based on a statutory interpretation.
13  
Courts have carved out a number of additional exceptions, which we refer to as 
idiosyncratic (see Table 3.1). These are exceptions that are peculiar to a few states or not 
uniformly recognized even within the same state. The label “idiosyncratic” does not refer 
to innovations made by courts in situations that have not previously arisen (as in 
Gennaioli-Shleifer 2007). Rather, idiosyncratic exceptions are exceptions rejected by 
other courts either explicitly or implicitly. For each case that we classify as having been 
decided on the basis of an idiosyncratic exception, there is a factually very similar case 
decided in favor of applying the ELR. 
Most of the idiosyncratic exceptions are independent duties created by courts. A 
few courts subject builders or architects to a tort duty to property owners or 
subcontractors. For example, Colorado and Georgia hold that builders owe property 
owners a tort duty independent of the ELR, but most courts do not. Sometimes an 
idiosyncratic exception is inconsistent with other cases in the same state. In an early 
Illinois case, an architect was held to owe an independent duty to purchasers of 
residential property, but most cases from Illinois apply the ELR in such cases.
14  
                                                 
13 In Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1995), the Florida court held that any misrepresentations of 
the defects in the house caused only economic losses. This was overruled in Wassall v. W H Payne 682 So. 
2d 678 (Fla. 1996) and has been disapproved in a number of other Florida cases. In Flagg Energy 
Development Corp. v General Motors Corp., 244 Conn. 126, 151–55 (1998), the Connecticut court 
dismissed the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, but while mentioning the ELR the court actually 
based its decision on an interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code. While the case has been 
distinguished in Connecticut, it has not been overruled or disapproved. 
14 Ferentchak v Frankfort, 121 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1984), was the early architect case. The similar cases from 
Illinois that upheld the ELR are Illinois Housing Development Authority v. M-Z Construction Corp., 110 
Ill. App. 3d 129 (1982); 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Association v. Mann, Gil, Ebel & Frazier, 
Ltd., 136 Ill. 2d 302 (1990); and Martusciello v. JDS Homes, Inc, 361 Ill. App. 3d 568 (2005). 
  14Some courts recognize an exception in cases in which the plaintiff has no 
contractual remedy, or confine the ELR to commercial, but not to residential, property 
owners. These “other reasons,” which seem motivated by sympathy for wronged 
plaintiffs seemingly barred by the ELR, are rejected by other courts and we code them as 
idiosyncratic exceptions. 
 
Brief Summary of the Data 
Cases are not distributed uniformly across the years 1970-2005 covered by the 
dataset. In some years we have no observations, while the maximum number of cases in 
one year is 28 (in 1998 and 2005). Figure 3.1 plots the number of cases each year, and 
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Figure 3.1: Number of cases in each year in our dataset. 
 
The growth in the number of ELR cases is affected by our search strategy in 
constructing the dataset. Many construction cases from the 1970s and 1980s do not refer 
to the ELR explicitly and hence are not included. The result is to bias the plaintiffs’ 
  15success rate downward in the early years of our sample. A plaintiff is more likely to have 
recovered economic damages in a case in which the ELR is not mentioned than in one in 
which it was.  
In the majority of our cases, a plaintiff property owner is suing a builder, 
architect, engineer, inspector, or manufacturer. In 331 cases (71.18%), the plaintiff is a 
property owner. Builders are the only other significant plaintiff category (involved in 
25.81% of the cases). The most frequent defendants are builders (involved in 34.84% of 
all cases), followed by manufacturers (27.10%), architects, engineers, and inspectors 







Manufacturer Other  Total 
Property 
Owner 
48 132 44 98 9 331
(71.18%)





1 7 0 1 0 9
(1.94%)
Manufacturer  1 1 0 2 0 4
(0.86%)













Table 3.2 Breakdown of the parties to the 465 disputes. 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the outcomes in our 465 cases. Plaintiffs won 170 cases 
(36.56%). The most frequent exceptions to the ELR found in our sample are other 
property (25.88% of all cases that plaintiffs win); idiosyncratic independent duties 
(22.94%); and independent torts (21.76%). Courts invoke generally recognized 
  16exceptions to the ELR in 113 of the 170 tortwin cases (66.47%) and idiosyncratic 
exceptions in the remaining 57 cases (33.53%). 
The data on means begin to tell the story of how the ELR has been applied in the 
construction industry. More than 63% of the cases apply the ELR and deny plaintiffs 
recovery in tort. In nearly 25% of the cases the decision is for the plaintiff based on a 
generally recognized exception to the ELR. Only about 12% of the cases apply 
idiosyncratic exceptions. On average, then, the ELR plus its generally recognized 
exceptions is widely, but not universally, accepted by state appellate courts. The question 
arises whether, over time, this acceptance has grown, suggesting convergence. If it has, 
what kinds of decision have withered away? If acceptance has not grown, what kinds of 
exception are responsible? We address these questions in the following sections. 
  Observations 
Generally recognized exceptions 
 Other  property 
 Independent  torts 
  Generally recognized independent duties 







  Idiosyncratic independent duties 
  Other reasons 













IV.   Aggregate Outcomes. 
  
  Figure 4.1 presents the fraction of cases each year in which plaintiffs won 
(tortwin). It reveals a U-shaped pattern: tortwin declines steadily over the first 20 years of 
the data but rises in the last decade. The frequency with which claims are rejected based 
on the ELR rises in the 1970s and 1980s but falls after the mid-1990s. 
  17There are various ways to establish the U shape more formally. One strategy is to 
use Locally Weighted Least Squares (Lowess) to fit the curve (Figure 4.2). We fit the 
Lowess curve over the 465 binary observations of tortwin. The trend curve is an amalgam 
of 465 linear regressions around each local point using a localized subset of the data. This 






















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of plaintiff tort victories each year 
 
The Lowess curve suggests that outcomes in our sample indeed follow a U-
shaped curve over time, with the bottom tortwin rate of about 30% reached in the early 
1990s. Thus, there has never been convergence on what we call the “strict” view of 
ELR—the view that it always bars the recovery of economic loss in tort. 
One can obtain the same U shape with more restrictive models. A simple 
quadratic model fitting case outcomes over time and time
2
 yields strongly significant 
                                                 
15 The smoothing parameter (referred to as bandwidth) is the proportion of all observations that each 
regression uses. The smaller the bandwidth, the coarser the trend line appears, since individual regressions 
are more localized. The default bandwidth for Lowess curves in STATA is 0.8 (meaning that each of the 465 
regressions uses 372 observations), which we use throughout. The picture is similar with a bandwidth of 
0.25, where each regression uses 116 observations.  
  18results. The coefficient on time is -3.7966 with a t-statistic of -2.70. The coefficient on 
time
2 is 0.0009 with a t-statistic of 2.70. Both are significant at the 1% level. The 
quadratic best fit suggests that the turning point came in 1993.  
We can also estimate linear regressions dividing the sample at various points in 
the late-1980s or early-1990s. These specifications yield a negative and statistically 
significant trend in tortwin in the earlier sub-sample and a positive and statistically 
significant trend in the later one (see Figure 4.3). This pattern, too, is inconsistent with 
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Line of best fit: tortwin 1970-1987
Line of best fit: tortwin 1988-2005
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Figure 4.3: Graph illustrating the significance of the downward trend in tortwin from 1970 to 1987 (t = -
1.98) and the upward trend from 1988 to 2005 (t = 2.05). The black trend line is the same lowess curve 
from Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.4 decomposes tortwin as a percentage of total cases into generally 
recognized and idiosyncratic exceptions. Both trend down in the 1970s and 1980s, except 
that the number of cases decided on the basis of generally recognized exceptions bottom 
out earlier, in the mid-1980s, at about 20% of all cases, and then begin rising gently (and 
not statistically significantly) in the mid 1990s to about 30% of all cases, with a decline at 
the end of the sample period back to 20%. Idiosyncratic exceptions fall until the mid-
1990s, to about 10% of all cases – a remarkable testament to apparent convergence to the 
ELR with generally recognized exceptions – except that they then rise back to around 
20% toward the end of the sample period. Both the downward trend before the mid-1990s 
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Year
Line of best fit, idiosyncratic exceptions: 1970-1994
Line of best fit, idiosyncratic exceptions: 1995-2005
Trend of idiosyncratic exceptions
 
Figure 4.5: Graph demonstrating the significance of the downturn in idiosyncratic exceptions over the 
period 1970-1993 (t = -2.02), and the significance of the upturn in over the period 1994-2005 (t = 1.83). 
The black Lowess curve is the same trend as the red line illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
The real story in these data seems to be the growth of idiosyncratic exceptions, 
both as a percentage of all cases and as a percentage of tortwin (see Figure 4.6), in the 
  21last decade of the sample. We do not see convergence to ELR with generally recognized 
exceptions, and thus reject the middle version of the ELR’s efficiency as well. Had this 
paper been written a decade ago, we would have concluded that the legal rule has 
converged to nearly universal acceptance of the ELR with generally recognized 
exceptions. The substantial and statistically significant growth in cases decided plaintiffs’ 
favor by application of the idiosyncratic exceptions in the last decade of the sample 
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of all tortwin cases that use idiosyncratic exceptions. 
 
To study these trends in more detail, we next break up the outcome data to 
determine which exceptions the courts use to allow the plaintiff to avoid the ELR. Figure 
4.7 shows the trend of the courts’ use of each of the exceptions over time.  The decline in 
plaintiff victories throughout the 1970s and 1980s comes mainly from a decrease in the 
number of cases in which plaintiffs are allowed to claim independent tort duties to them. 
Both cases involving generally recognized independent duties and cases involving 
  22idiosyncratic independent duties fall significantly over this period.
16 There is also a 
significant decline in cases involving independent torts until the mid-1990s.
17
The increase in plaintiff victories from the mid-1990s onwards is harder to break 
down. While all the exceptions trend upwards, particularly the other property, 
independent torts, and idiosyncratic independent duty exceptions, none of them 
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Figure 4.7: The breakdown of the incidence of exceptions over time. 
 
 
  Another way to look at the patterns is by focusing on dissents in judicial opinions; 
55 of our 465 cases include at least one dissenting opinion. Overall there is no difference 
between the frequency of dissents in cases in which the ELR is upheld and in the cases in 
which an exception is made. But in cases in which the court relies on an exception that is 
idiosyncratic, the incidence of dissent is, as one would expect, significantly higher, as 
                                                 
16 For the sub-sample 1970 to 1992, generally recognized independent duties fall significantly: t = -2.69 
(significant at 1% level). For the sub-sample 1970 to 1998, idiosyncratic independent duties fall 
significantly: t = -2.12 (significant at 5% level). 
17 Over the sub-sample 1970 to 1995, independent torts fall significantly: t = -2.27 (significant at 5% level). 
  23“idiosyncratic” implies that the law is unsettled. Of the 113 cases in which generally 
recognized exceptions were applied, only 10 (8.84%) included a dissent, while in the 57 
cases in which idiosyncratic exceptions were applied, 11 cases (19.29%) included a 
dissent. This difference is significant at the 5% level (t = -1.97). 
A look at the frequency of dissents over time yields additional insights. As Figure 
4.8 shows, there is a significant downward trend in dissents in cases in which the ELR is 
used to defeat recovery.
18 In other words, when the majority enforces the ELR as a bar to 
recovery, the presence of opposing voices is diminishing. Dissents in the cases in which 
exceptions are applied exhibit no statistically significant trends. Thus suggests that courts 
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Figure 4.8: Incidence of dissents in cases where the ELR is applied and cases where exceptions are made. 
 
Predictability 
                                                 
18 Coefficient = -0 00544 (t = -2.14). 
  24  Parties to a construction-related transaction who are deciding whether to write a 
contract and if so what to put in it are interested in what a court would do should they 
have a dispute. Courts might be predictable but still use inefficient rules, which would 
induce the parties to contract more carefully or take some other measure to minimize the 
likelihood of getting involved in litigation—all at a cost. If courts are unpredictable, 
transacting parties will bear an extra cost in the form of uncertainty about the outcome of 
any dispute that might arise—an uncertainty that a contract (or a more complete contract) 
would reduce provided the judicial interpretation of contracts is more predictable than the 
judicial application of the ELR.  
   Determining whether judicial behavior is predictable in this situation is difficult 
for us for a number of reasons. First, we do not have all the details of the transactions 
involved in the cases, and the contracting parties and even the courts know more about 
those details than the authors of a statistical study can know. Second, predictability 
depends on when the transaction took place and in what jurisdiction. Third, from the 
point of view of predictability, we have a highly unrepresentative sample, as it is limited 
to disputes that went all the way to state appellate courts, indicating that the parties’ 
views of the facts and the law were so different that they could not settle the case. 
  Still, we can ask, as a start, how predictable the courts are if parties have our full 
data sample in their heads and believe that courts apply the ELR subject only to generally 
recognized exceptions. Parties with this knowledge and belief would be correct nearly 
88% of the time. The predictability of the rule does not change significantly even if the 
parties have additional information, such as the state whose courts would resolve the 
  25dispute and the type of plaintiff and defendant that they are.
19 Predictability was much 
lower at the beginning of the sample, with many fewer cases to base predictions on. That 
is inevitable at the outset of any common law doctrinal development. More disturbing is 
that idiosyncratic exceptions were on the rise toward the end of our sample period.  
  In short, judicial behavior with regard to the application of the ELR in the 
construction industry is fairly predictable but far from certain. Parties expecting courts to 
apply the ELR with generally recognized exceptions in the event of a dispute to which 
the ELR might be applicable are in for a surprise about 12% of the time. We cannot say 
based on our data how much extra risk-bearing and contracting costs this level of 
unpredictability entails.  
 
Summary 
  The story that emerges from the trends we analyze does not confirm any simple 
theory of the evolution of common law. The law does not start at an efficient point, but it 
is also very far from being random. The majority of the appellate courts in our sample 
accept the ELR, and when they do not, they often rely on generally recognized 
exceptions. Judicial behavior is fairly predictable, but far from certain.  
The evolution of the law over time reveals some fascinating patterns. The initial 
twenty years after the Seely decision, the case that set the law on its modern path, are best 
described as years of growing acceptance of the ELR, with declining application of either 
                                                 
19 We run a probit regression of the rule being used on case facts, such as state, plaintiff type, defendant 
type. We predict when a court will use an idiosyncratic exception using this factor-based approach and note 
that the additional facts do not generate any additional predictive value. This factor-based approach and its 
extensions have been used by political scientists (e.g., Segal 1984, Richards and Kritzer 2002) to 
investigate the predictability of (mostly U.S. Supreme Court) case outcomes rather than the predictability 
of the application of a particular legal rule. See also Cameron and Kornhauser (2005) for a discussion of 
theoretical issues with this literature. 
  26generally recognized or idiosyncratic exceptions. In the final decade of the sample, 
however, courts moved away from strict application of the ELR as a result of more 
frequently invoking some of the generally recognized exceptions, such as the independent 
tort and other property exceptions, and – more surprisingly – some of the idiosyncratic 
exceptions as well. The data reveal no convergence to any rule, let alone an efficient rule 
under either of our candidate definitions of efficiency. 
As we noted in the introduction, we cannot reject the view that judicial decisions 
are efficient if we adopt a sufficiently broad definition of efficiency, one that allows for 
the possibility that the law and the facts are more complicated that one can learn from 
reading a judicial opinion. Perhaps if all were known, the cases would be understood to 
produce efficient outcomes in a larger percentage of cases. But although there are 
dissents in only about one-eighth of the cases, these dissents are much more frequent 
when idiosyncratic exceptions are applied, which casts some doubt on the hypothesis that 
those decisions would be seen as efficient if only enough details were known about them. 
  So what is behind the time patterns we observe: both the convergence toward the 
ELR in the first 20 years of the sample and the movement away from it afterwards? In the 
next section we address this question from different perspectives.  
 
V. Behind the Patterns.  
We try to deepen our understanding of the patterns uncovered in section IV by 
examining five aspects of the evolution of the ELR in the construction industry. First, we 
examine the claims that plaintiffs make in our sample and ask whether changes in those 
claims can explain the patterns of court decisions. In a decentralized world of legal 
  27evolution, plaintiffs would try new strategies when they found barriers to recovery with 
old ones. Perhaps the movement away from the ELR in later years reflects such 
adaptation, as plaintiffs discover or invent claims to which courts are more receptive.  
Second, we examine whether the application of the ELR is influenced by the 
existence of an explicit contract between the parties. Because the presence of such a 
contract indicates that the parties considered the various risks of their relationship, courts 
may be more likely to apply the ELR to tort claims when litigants have a contract.  
Third, we investigate the relative economic power of the plaintiff and defendant. 
Judges’ sympathy for weaker parties may help explain deviations from the ELR in cases 
in which plaintiffs have less economic power than the defendants. 
Fourth, we examine court leadership. In 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 
decision in an admiralty case, East River,
20 which broadly endorsed the ELR. Although 
East River is far away from construction and is not binding on state courts applying state 
law, we can ask whether the decision influenced the state courts in construction cases.  
Fifth, we examine state variation in decisions. We ask whether the lack of 
convergence to the ELR is explained by the fact that in many states there are very few 
appellate cases involving ELR in construction. Perhaps it is those states that account for 
lack of convergence in the aggregate. By looking at the states with the highest caseloads, 
we can ask whether those states exhibit a greater tendency to convergence.  
 
Claims 
Figure 5.1 shows that the proportion of cases in which the plaintiff claims 
negligence has been falling (statistically significantly) since the mid-1980s. While claims 
                                                 
20 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
  28of strict liability have also trended downward since the start of our sample, the trend is 
significant only over certain periods. As the ELR becomes increasingly accepted, 
plaintiffs are using types of claim less likely to be barred by it. The increase in claims of 
fraud is mildly significant since the early 1980s, while the increase in claims of negligent 
misrepresentation over the same period is strongly significant.
21 The increase in claims 
for “other torts” is significant over the course of our entire sample.
22 We get very similar 
results if we look at the claims relative to tortwin cases rather than relative to all cases. 
   The change in the nature of plaintiff claims can explain some of the rise in 
tortwins. Put simply, plaintiffs claim fraud and courts are receptive. However, the 













































Figure 5.1: Trends in claims made by plaintiffs. 
 
ELR and the Contractual Relationship between Parties 
                                                 
21 Over 1983-2005, the trend for fraud is positive and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.92). In the same 
period, the trend for negligent misrepresentation claims is positive and significant at the 1% level (t = 2.93). 
22 From 1970 to 2005, the trend for “other torts” is positive and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.78). 
  29We consider whether judicial application of the ELR depends on whether the 
parties have an express written contract – thus excluding oral contracts, implied 
warranties, and contractual rights as a third-party beneficiary of someone else’s contracts. 
If the courts want to promote efficiency, they may be more willing to apply the ELR 
when the parties have gone to the trouble of defining their relationship in a contract. Seely 
itself may be an example of such logic.  
In Table 5.1 the percentage of tortwin is greater when plaintiffs do not have an 
express written contract, although the difference is not quite significant (t = 1.53). And 
courts are significantly more likely to rely on idiosyncratic exceptions when the parties 
do not have a contract (t = 1.95). Courts in effect “make” a contract for the plaintiff when 
there is no actual contract between the parties, rather than being willing to penalize the 
plaintiff for having failed to negotiate a contract that would have protected him from the 
loss that he is suing to recover. 
 Cases  Tortwin%  Idiosyncratic%
Parties did not have an express written contract  288  39.27%  14.58% 
Parties did have an express written contract  177  32.20%  8.47% 
Table 5.1: Breakdown of tortwin and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions depending on whether parties 
had an express written contract. 
 
If courts are moving toward efficiency, the tortwin percentage in cases in which 
parties have an express written contract should fall over time. The data in Figure 5.2 do 
not support this hypothesis. Both tortwin and the use of idiosyncratic exceptions rise 
significantly after 1997. (The initial downward trend is not significant.) Courts are 
becoming more willing to allow exceptions to the ELR when the parties have a contract, 
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Figure 5.2: Tortwin and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions when examining only the 177 cases where 
parties have an express contract. 
 
We can further investigate whether success in tort and contract are substitutes or 
complements in the 291 cases in which plaintiffs claim both tort and breach of contract. 
Table 5.3 reveals positive correlation (0.2316) between tortwin and winning in contract (t 
= 4.11). And there is no statistical difference in the use of idiosyncratic exceptions when 
plaintiffs win and when plaintiffs lose their contract claims (t = 0.99). 
  Cases  Tortwin %  Idiosyncratic % 
Plaintiff won contract claim  106  45.28%  12.26% 
Plaintiff lost contract claim  185  22.70%  8.65% 
Table 5.3: Breakdown of tortwin and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions depending on whether plaintiffs 
won their contract claim. 
  
  The focus on the contractual relationship casts further doubt on the hypothesis 
that the law is converging toward an efficient rule. Although the hypothesis that judges 
favor defendants who were in a contractual relationship with the plaintiff is weakly 
supported, the fact that outcomes in tort and in contract are positively correlated suggests 
that courts are allowing exceptions to the ELR even when claims in contract are valid. 
  31The trends in tortwin and in the application idiosyncratic exceptions also suggest that 
courts increasingly are allowing plaintiffs to recover in tort even when they have an 
express written contract with the defendant.   
 
Relative Economic Power of the Parties 
  We now examine the hypothesis that the relative economic power of plaintiff and 
defendant affects the courts’ application of the ELR. Table 5.4 divides parties into two 
groups that provide us with a rough proxy for economic power. 
Weak parties  Strong parties 
•  Individual property owners and tenants 
•  Associations of residents 
•  Subcontractors and small builders 
•  Commercial property owners 
•  Public property owners 
•  General contractors 
•  Developers 
•  Architects and engineers 
•  Inspectors 
•  Manufacturers 
•  Suppliers 
•  Other parties (banks, insurance 
companies, real estate agents) 
Table 5.4: Broad division of parties into “weak” and “strong”.  
 
Table 5.5 shows the rate of plaintiff recovery and the incidence of idiosyncratic 
exceptions for the four types of plaintiff-defendant combinations. 
Relationship Cases  (%)  Tortwin %  Idiosyncratic %
Weak plaintiff – weak defendant  73 (15.70%) 43.86%  12.33%
Weak plaintiff – strong defendant  154 (33.12%) 37.66%  17.53%
Strong plaintiff – weak defendant  35 (7.53%) 34.29%  17.14%
Strong plaintiff – strong defendant  203 (43.66%) 33.50%  7.39%
Table 5.5: Breakdown of tortwin and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions by relative economic power of 
the parties. 
 
There is no statistically significant difference between the groups in tortwin 
percentages. Courts are more likely to apply an idiosyncratic exception when facing a 
weak plaintiff and strong defendant (17.53% of cases) compared to when both parties are 
  32strong (7.39% of cases). This difference is highly significant (t = -2.97). However, the 
application of idiosyncratic exceptions is also higher when courts face a strong plaintiff 
and weak defendant (17.14%) than when both parties are strong (t = -1.89). No other 
differences are significant. This evidence offers mild support for the idea that sympathy 
moves courts to use idiosyncratic exceptions to help weak plaintiffs.    
 
The Potential Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in East River  
In East River (1986) the Court endorsed bright-line ELR. A plaintiff shipbuilder 
had a contract with the defendant to design, manufacture, and install turbines for four 
supertankers. The ships malfunctioned and were damaged, and the plaintiff sought to 
recover the costs of repair, plus income lost while the ships were out of service. The 
plaintiff initially made claims in both contract and tort; but the contract claims turned out 
to be barred by the statute of limitations. The negligence claims were rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which held that customer dissatisfaction with product quality is not a 
cognizable claim in admiralty tort law. Following the reasoning in Seely, the Court held 
that such claims can be brought only as claims for breach of warranty.  
Although the East River decision was not binding on state courts, we examine 
whether it had a significant influence on those courts in the construction realm. Influence 
is difficult to ascertain here, since, as we showed in Section IV, tortwin had been trending 
down for at least a decade before East River and bottomed out in the early 1990s. We 
find no effect of East River on the speed of convergence.  
Another way to assess influence is by number of citations. Since East River 
denies recovery, we expect that state court decisions that cite East River are likely to   
  33deny liability. Indeed, 52 of the 68 cases (76.47%) in our sample that cite East River deny 
the plaintiff recovery, while only 196 of the 314 cases since East River that do not cite 
the case deny recovery (62.42%). This difference is significant (t-test statistic = 2.21). 
Still, one needs to be cautious: cases that cite East River may do so as cover, trading on 
the prestige of the Supreme Court, whereas cases that do not cite East River can justify 
not citing it on the ground that an admiralty case is irrelevant to construction disputes. If 
this explanation is correct, the citation evidence yields some support for the “legal realist” 
hypothesis that state courts do what they want and use citations to provide rhetorical 
support for their conclusions.  
While East River may have had some influence in consolidating support for the 
ELR, the proportion of cases citing East River has fallen since the early 1990s. This trend 
is significant (t = -2.24 for years 1990-2005). We cannot conclude from our data that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has had a major influence on the state courts’ treatment of ELR, at 
least in the construction industry. 
 
Variation across States   
There is tremendous variation in tortwin across states. Kentucky has 100% 
tortwin; Wyoming, Kansas, Virginia, and Maine have 0% tortwin. We ask whether 
tortwin can be explained by geographical or economic differences; the answer appears to 
be no.
23 We ask whether the differences in tortwin can be explained by the methods in 
which judges are selected and retained that different states employ, and again the answer 
                                                 
23 Testing for differences in tortwin across regions does not provide any notable patterns. Testing for 
differences based on levels of economic growth in each state from 1970 to 2005 generates insignificant 
results; and testing for differences based on growth in the construction industry in each state from 1970 to 
2005 also yields insignificant results.  
  34is no.
24 Nor can differences in tortwin be explained by differences among judges in 
political ideology.
25
Some states have fewer cases than others, and perhaps states with the highest 
caseloads, which have had the most experience with the ELR, have more respect for the 
doctrine. To examine this hypothesis, we focus on the five states with the highest 
caseloads in our sample. In these states, tortwin percentage varies greatly (see Table 5.6). 
New York is very strict on plaintiffs, with a mere 15.91% tortwin, while California is far 
more lenient, with a 52.94% tortwin. High caseload does not explain greater adherence to 
the ELR: tortwin is not significantly affected by the number of cases decided in a state (t 
= -1.22).  
STATE  Total cases  Tortwin  % tortwin Idiosyncratic  Idiosyncratic%
CA  34 18 52.94 3 8.82
FL  47 19 40.43 3 6.38
OH  32 12 37.50 2 6.25
IL  56 18 32.14 4 7.14
NY  44 7 15.91 2 4.55
Total 213  139 34.74 14 6.57
Table 5.6: Tortwin and use of exceptions in five states with highest caseloads 
 
Not only do the averages differ greatly across the five busiest states; so do the 
trends (Figure 5.3). The percentage of tortwin in California is high on average but 
significantly decreasing over time (t = -2.62). In contrast, tortwin in New York and 
                                                 
24 States differ in the method by which judges ascend to the bench and in the way they are retained. We 
investigate whether this has any effect on the application of the ELR and its exceptions. We use the 
categories employed in Choi, Gulati, and E. Posner (2007) to divide states into four types of judicial 
selection method (appointed, merit-selected, partisan election or nonpartisan elections). The methods by 
which judges are retained are highly correlated with selection method. The differences in tortwin across 
states of different judicial selection methods are not significant. 
25 Using a simple measure of party-adjusted surrogate judicial ideology (“PAJID”) from Brace, Langer, and 
Hall (2000), we test whether the ideology of the Supreme Court judges in a given state can help explain the 
variation in tortwin across states. In the cases in which the court upheld the ELR to preclude recovery, the 
average PAJID score was 47.20. In tortwin cases, the average PAJID score was 47.46. The difference is not 
significant (t = 0.1817). 
  35Illinois is considerably lower but growing. In Florida, the increase in the frequency of 
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Figure 5.3: Tortwin over time in the five states with the highest caseloads 
 
Unlike the overall tortwin pattern, the proportion of cases that apply exceptions 
that are idiosyncratic is influenced by caseload. This inverse relation is significant (t = -
2.85) and is illustrated in Figure 5.4. The implication is that idiosyncratic exceptions are 
more likely to be introduced when courts have less of their own experience in this area. 
This hypothesis is supported by a comparison of the first 10 decisions heard in each state 
with the subsequent decisions in those states (if the state hears at least 10 cases). 15.81% 
of the “early” cases in these states applied exceptions that are idiosyncratic, compared to 
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of cases that use idiosyncratic exceptions regressed on the number of cases in a 
state (t = -2.85). 
 
The punch line of this analysis is that low state caseloads might offer an 
explanation for why we have not seen stronger convergence to the ELR, and more 
specifically why we have seen an increase in the use of idiosyncratic exceptions in the 
past decade. Although the ELR is quite widely accepted, the law does not come to a rest, 
and states continue experimentation, often in ways inconsistent with the ELR and its 
generally recognized exceptions. Experience slows this experimentation down, as one 
would expect, but not completely.  
The increase in the application of idiosyncratic exceptions is not limited to states 
with low caseloads. In fact, 76% of idiosyncratic exception cases since 1997 have come 
from states with 10 or more cases. Wisconsin (the state with the sixth highest caseload) 
has seen a sharp rise in cases decided by the application of idiosyncratic exceptions. Four 
of the five largest states have all used an idiosyncratic exception in the last six years of 
  37our sample. Thus, even in busy states we see an increasing tendency of courts to get 
around the ELR.  
 
VI. Conclusion.  
Our investigation of the application of the Economic Loss Rule to construction 
disputes yields some surprising results. Over the 35 years covered by our study, the 
doctrine has evolved in a way that cannot be easily described as convergence to 
efficiency. While over the first quarter century the law moved significantly toward 
adopting the ELR with generally recognized exceptions, over the last decade it has 
moved away from this equilibrium. Had we written this paper 10 years ago, we would 
have found the law converging to ELR with generally recognized exceptions, but the law 
moved away from that rule afterwards, with no changes in the economic environment to 
explain the movement. Moreover, the law evolved very differently in different states, 
which is inconsistent with efficiency in the absence of an economic explanation for the 
differences among states in the nature of construction disputes.  
The lack of full convergence does not mean that judicial behavior is random or 
that the law is entirely unpredictable. On average in our sample, courts in construction 
disputes applied the ELR with generally recognized exceptions about 88% of the time, 
which would give the parties engaged in a transaction in which a potential ELR issue 
lurked reasonable though not complete certainty. The more unsettling findings are that 
the law has become less predictable in the last decade, that many states are increasingly 
using idiosyncratic exceptions to limit the ELR, and that the amount of appellate 
  38litigation involving ELR in construction disputes is growing. These are not signs of the 
law settling down.  
Some additional evidence sheds light on how legal evolution works. Plaintiffs’ 
claims respond to what courts are receptive to, such as claims of fraud. But that is not the 
whole story. The key reason for non-convergence is that courts distinguish cases and 
create idiosyncratic exceptions to the prevailing legal doctrine that other courts reject. In 
the last decade covered by our study, courts increasingly used such exceptions even when 
the parties had express contracts. 
Idiosyncratic exceptions differ across states, with many states going in their own 
direction with regard to what exceptions they recognize or create. State courts at first 
responded to a nonbinding 1986 U.S. Supreme Court ruling embracing the bright-line 
ELR in an admiralty case, but this influence declined over time. There is evidence that 
state courts with heavier caseloads in this area of litigation are more likely to converge to 
the adoption of the ELR with generally recognized exceptions, but even in those states 
there is residual uncertainty.  
We conclude that appellate courts exercise a moderate amount of discretion in 
deciding cases, leaving the law reasonably predictable but far from certain, even after 
three decades of evolution. The deviations from efficiency are not huge, but they do not 
disappear over time. There may be evolutionary benefits of such legal flexibility, but the 
hypothesis that, in traditional commercial areas, common law is predictable and efficient, 
or at least is moving there, is not supported by the evidence in this very particular sphere.  
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  41Appendix: Construction of the Database 
All data are obtained from the LexisNexis “Construction” library. To find the 
cases, we searched the library for state appeals court cases decided prior to December 31, 
2005, that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the phrase “economic loss” is found in either 
the Overview or the Core Terms; and (2) any of the following terms—“contract!”, 
“agree!”, or “warrant!”—are found in the Overview or the Core Terms. The Overview is a 
summary of the case of approximately 150 to 200 words. The Core Terms is a list of 30 
to 50 key terms that appear in the decision. This search strategy captures all state appeals 
cases from the construction industry where the ELR defense is raised by defense lawyers. 
No issue of different coverage periods for different states arises in our sample period. 
This search yielded 1171 cases. Of these, 209 were not appellate cases and so 
were dropped, and another 4 were not from state courts. Another 496 cases were 
excluded as irrelevant because the LexisNexis Construction library turns out to include 
cases that do not pertain to construction. In 50 cases, more than one dispute is addressed 
on appeal. For example, a plaintiff may bring claims against the general contractor and 
subcontractors in one case. When the plaintiff brings different claims against the two 
defendants and both claims are being heard on appeal, we divide the case into two 
distinct observations. When the plaintiff brings claims against multiple defendants but the 
appeal addresses only one of them, it is left as one observation. We have 46 cases that 
give rise to 2 observations and 4 cases that give rise to 3 observations; the other 412 cases 
involve single claims decided on appeal. Of the 516 individual disputes thus coded, 37 do 
not involve tort claims and another 14 involve tort claims that were not appealed. After 
removing these 51 disputes, we have the sample of 465 observations. 
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